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The march of capitalism into Africa is often made to
appear inexorable. Indeed, some scholars have defined the
possibility of a failure, a missed possibility of domina-
tion, out of existence: the survival of pre-capitalist
modes of production are simply a way by which the costs
of labor or cash crops are subsidized by subsistence culti-
vation. But how is one to tell whether the cultivator's
access to the soil represents a dangerous automony, a
tenacious resistance to becoming subject to industrial
work rhythms and control over all aspects of a working
life, or else constitutes a perfectly functional part
of a superexploitative system?1
The conditions of rural and urban workers in South
Africa is likely to suggest itself in answer to that
question. But the best of research in South African
labor history has focused on the specific processes by
which labor was controlled and has not neglected the
persistence of resistance — in individual and daily
behaviour in farms and factories as much as in collective
action.2 A look beyond South Africa emphasizes how elusive
similar objectives could be, and how essential it is to
ask just what kind of transformations capital and the state
sought, how they tried to effect them, and what they were
unable to do.3
Much of the literature on the "articulation" of modes
of production stresses structural juxtapositions, not
processes. And that gets away from the most basic if most
difficult aspects of Marx's treatment of capitalism,
that it was based on two quite particular and quite well
masked forms of coercion: primitive accumulation— the
permanent alienation of workers from the means of production-
and the labor process itself- the daily struggle to make
workers work. Primitive accumulation is not the mere amassing
of resources, nor is it legal title to land: it is the effective exclusion
of acess to the means of production of an entire class. And to say that
means to ask how they were kept away. The labor process itself entails
distinct mechanisms—from supervision on the shop floor to the educational
system—to control the pace and intensity of labor, which in turn foster
distinct patterns of resistance. Our task is not to arrive at a rigid and
pristine definition of capitalism, but to look at accumulation and the
labor process as the specific and complex phenomena they are. They embody
the action of people and institutions, and the consequences of such actions
not being complete need to be taken seriously.
This study of Zanzibar looks at an attempt that penetrated to the heart
of the labor process, an effort to make slave labor into wage labor. It
involved non-white landowners and non-white workers in a British colony, but
the division between landowners and workers was no less fundamental for the
racial complexity of Zanzibar. British officials were clear that they wanted
to make slaves into an agricultural proletariat, but they ended up with a complex
system of labor migration, shaped as much by the ex-slaves as by the state
or the ex-slaveowners. I have discussed the evidence and details of this
process at length elsewhere; my aim here to to discuss some basic issues that
it raises in terms that might suggest comparative perspectives.
In the early nineteenth century, immigrant Arabs from Oman developed
a near monopoly of the world's clove crop on the fertile islands of
Zanzibar and its adjacent dependency of Pemba. Connected by expanding trade
routes to distant sources of slaves in central Africa and by largely Indian-
dominated networks that channeled credit and produce throughout the Indian
Ocean region, Omanis built up slave plantations that were vast even by West
Indian standards, with as many as hundreds of slaves. They worked in gangs
under supervision, five days a week (seven in the harvest) on their owners'
land, the rest of the time on small plots provided by their owners for
subsistence cultivation. The extent of exploitation was limited above all by
the weakness of the state and communal divisions of the planters and by the
delicate nature of clove harvesting. Social, economic, and political dependence-
all conceived of in terms of Islamic patriarchy—was as important to extracting
labor as coercion.
When Zanzibar became a British Protectorate in 1890, officials were well
aware that clove production was high and growing and that any transformation
of how they were grown would be a large task, potentially threatening to revenues
and order. And so action was delayed until 1897, when the colonial state
had been consolidated. However, there was never any question that slavery had
to be abolished eventually. Anti-slavery was a minor corollary to a major
theorem. From the late eighteenth century, the contrast of wage labor with
slavery had been crucial to articulating a point that was by no means obvious
to wage workers in England: that free labor was economically and morally
superior to any other. Work extracted through immediate threat and a wider
pattern of violence was contrasted with the internalized discipline of the
wage worker and the self-regulating nature of the labor market. And personal
dependence, as much as personal tyranny, was incompatible with a capitalist
social order.
By the late nineteenth century, abolitionism had become somewhat more
conservative- more skeptical about whether ex-slaves would actually work and
therefore concerned that the state and a class of owners and managers had to
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keep a close watch even as the labor system was changed. There was only one
such class around — the Arab slaveowners—Ctptf the state never considered
that cloves could be grown without planters. So the state's effort was on
the one hand conservative: it recognized the titles to land and clove trees
of the slaveowners and sought to attach in some way the labor force to them.
On the other hand, the effort was radical. It sought a fundamental
transformation of attitudes and values. Work should no longer come from threats
of the whip or relations of dependence with an individual; it should become
a central principle of the workerTs life. The state used the civil law—contracts-
to maintain social relationships between landowners and workers, meanwhile
stressing that it was the institution of property and the legal power of the
state—not the personal power of a lord—that lay behind the new form of
social dependence. And it used the criminal law—prosecution for vagrancy
and deviations from an orderly life on or off the job—to inculcate new values
among the propertyless. Meanwhile, the state engaged in a far reaching effort
at control, shaping where, when, and for what wages people worked. The colonial
state was not simply seeking workers, but hegemony, not simply cloves, but
control of the production process.
But if control of production implied hierarchy, authority, and supervision,
it came up against the fact that the supervisors might have their own equally
strong concepts of work. The Muslim planters of Zanzibar thought more in terms
of long-term, multidimensional dependence than of contractual relationships
and universal work values. What was crucial was not so much the differing
cultural values of the state and capital in Zanzibar, but the relationship of
both sets of values to the actual exercise of economic power. The slaves faced
a double struggle: against the personal power of their owners, and against
the rigid conceptions of labor of the state. If access to a labor market
might provide alternatives to dependence Oft one's own landlord, long-term
access to land—intrinsic to dependence—might be a means of avoiding
total f&\4.AC& . on wage labor. The divergence of state and capital was to
provide a crucial basis for slaves' ability to maneuver.
Between 1897 and 1907, some 11,000 slaves went to court and received
freedom certificates. Their masters received compensation. By 1900, however,
fewer slaves were bothering to go to court. The claims of some made it less
necessary for others of the perhaps 100,000 slaves of Zanzibar to make their
claims in court. Ex-slaves were careful about leaving a slaveowner. They
often waited until after the harvest. They were less likely to leave a rich
landowner than one of modest means, and were most likely to leave a demanding
clove planter. There occurred what one official called a "shuffling of the
cards." Other slaves—continuing a process that began more with British
takeover and the political decline of Arab planters than with legal abolition
per se—went to remote areas of the islands or to plantations that the Agricultural
Department had taken over from the Zanzibar Royal Family and could not supervise
closely. Still others sought urban casual labor or railroad and porterage
work on the mainland of East Africa. There thus ensued competition in what
had been a tied labor system: plantation owners lined up outside the courts,
seeking new resident laborers from newly freed slaves. And so terms of
labor shifted in favor of the workers: five days per week under slavery
became three, and then withered away. Landowners expected their resident laborers
to work, but had to pay them daily for them to do so during the harvest.
The skill and timing of the clove harvest made planters particularly
vulnerable. Cloves—buds that appear at the end of branches—had to be picked
before they became overripe, and careless picking could damage the tree.
Harvest labor thus became particularly competitive, and picking wages rose
rapidly during the course of each harvest.
But there was no crisis of- clove production. With piecework wages,
pickers picked. This did little to improve the image of ex-slaves in officials'
eyes: "stead* regular work is just what your slave or free slave dislikes
very much." The problem was that harvest labor, characteristic of the
task orientation in pre-capitalist economies, involved a burst of energy.
Pickers, with piecework, could work as fast or as long as they wanted to.
Slaves worked, but they were not workers. The crux of the problem was that
they had access to land to grow food, for that is what the landlords—eager
for residents on their plantations even if they could not get as much work
out of them—had to offer. What happened on these plots, in Brititeh ideology,
was not work.
If the only way to insure that genuine workers were created was to
control their entire working year, not just the working day, the state did
not like the idea of paying for it. This contradiction was at the heart of
ambivalent Victorian attitudes toward casual labor, in East London as much as
in Zanzibar. As Gareth Stedman Jones has argue</. casual labor was a^dangerous
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as it was cheap. In an agricultural economy, the control of seasonal labor
required either that the existence of peasant-workers be so marginal that they
would appear whenever they were offered the chance, or that a web of coercion
be drawn so tightly that they would appear on command. Thus officials bemoaned
the fertility of Zanzibar, that allowed even a relatively dense population to
grow its food, and faced the problem of how a state—convinced that a colonial
society must be predictable and orderly—could exercise force.
The contract system was the first means to combine the exercise of
coercion with the legitimating force of the law. Behind it lay the possibility
of making ex-slaves needs for some cash—and hence a desire to work part
of the year—into a legal requirement that they work all year. The intimidating
atmosphere of the court where freedom papers were issues was at first used
to pressure slaves into accepting contracts with their old or a new master,
and for a time certificates were refused unless slaves agreed to contracts—
although that proved to be too much for the anti-slavery ideology- Then vagrancy
statutes and administrative harassment were used to induce ex-slaves to agree
to the year-long contracts, under which the state was invoked to discipline
bad work.
There is evidence that the state mustered force to intimidate urban workers
who shirked contracts. But to do so in rural areas was an awesome task, especially
when there were only thirty white officials in Zanzibar. Laborers agreed to
the contracts and then simply did not do the three days of weekly labor that
they stipulated. During the bussle of the harvest, contractual obligations
rapidly broke down as neighboring planters offered substantial daily wages.
By 1904, the contract system had come apart. Landowners found little in it for
themselves. The Government was too weak to evict people who did not agree to
contracts or to catch evaders and shirkers, and it would have had to do so
on a systematic basis to end competition for labor. Planters were too desperate
to turn away someone who had reneged on a previous contract.
The legallized coercion of contracts did not get to the heart of the
matter. Power had to be exercised on the plantation and off it. For ex-slaves,
mobility was the key to the undermining of older patterns of labor control and of
establishing a bargaining position within the new patterns. At the same time,
the withdrawl of labor time—as ex-slaves escaped the control over their
previously
working year and the compulsory obligations of harvest labor—added to the
8competition. The contract system engendered its own forms of resistance—
shirking and contract breaking.
If contracts and restrictive forms of tenancy agreements succeeded in
other parts of the world in tying down a labor force, the case of Zanzibar
suggests how important it is to focus on the actual operation of such
systems, on evictions, on pass systems, and on the effective monitoring of
what happens on a farm by people whose interests were congruent with those
of the state.
The failure of the contract system left a squatter system that had .
been evolving all along. This system was extra-legal, involving the exchange
of long-term access to land . for non-specific services, which
squatters were expected to provide but which had to be paid for. Labor
rent withered away. Tenants got rights to use land, but not to plant trees,
and the system was tolerable—if far from desirable—to clove planters in
that it was congruent with the fact that most estates included ridges, where
clove trees grew, and other kinds of land more suitable to ground crops like
maize and cassava. Squatting had a social dimension as well: the landowner
became a guardian under Islamic law and a resident population on the plantation
contributed to his standing as well as provided a minimal labor force.
The system made sense in terms of Arab planters' ideology, stressing
personal and long-term relationships rather than contractual ones. It also
recognized that land was the one asset they had, as the threat of coercion or
the offer of political protection had lost their impact. If the relationship
of squatter and landlord, like that of slave and master, involved reciprocity,
the terms of that reciprocity had now shifted in the squattters* favor. Still, an
ideology of patriarchy rationalized economic necessity into benevolence.
The failure of the state to build an agricultural work force within
the estate led it to look outside it, a pattern that had helped to check
the increasing autonomy and decreasing labor time of emancipated slaves in
the British Caribbean. Officials first sought labor from Swahili-speaking,
Muslim peoples on the islands who had been pushed (especially on Zanzibar
Island) to the edges of the fertile zones. They had inferior access to
markets and inferior soil to the planters, but they were economically and
socially autonomous during the nineteenth century. At first, forced labor
was the heart of recruitment. In 1901 in Pemba and in 1904 in Zanzibar,
headmen in Swahili villages were ordered to recruit harvest labor. The
1905 and 1907 harvests—both excellent—proved the value of this labor.
By 1911, the role of village heads in recruitment had diminished, but the
harvest laborers were coming forth on their own.
As many as 10-15,000 Swahili from Zanzibar went to Pemba—which had
more clove trees—during each harvest. Women and children went along with
men to pick. Yet even though the Government offered free transport home
if they worked a minimum number of days, most returned on their own. If
wages were below what they expected or if they caught owners using false
measures, laborers were quick to leave. The Government—into the 1920s—
thus remained frustrated even as harvests were good, and it tried various
schemes—from incentives to contracts—to keep workers on the job longer.
The police were used to discipline people for working poorly, above all
for branch-breaking. None of these efforts was successful.
Officials estimated that the cost of labor (per unit of output) rose
150 per cent between the 1880s and 1920, and it spurted again in 1919-21.
In 1924, when clove prices fell, the state began a new assault on wages.
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The state organized committees of planters to fix wages. The scheme was a
partial success, but many planters surreptiously paid higher wages. Picking
costs were driven down by about 20 per cent, but prices were then falling
even more.
The clove pickers—both migrant Swahili and ex-slave squatters—
were using access to land to obtain some control over how much and under
what conditions they worked and to resist efforts at regularizing their
terms of labor. They did so even at the cost of transport subsidies and
longer periods of earning wages. But by the 1920s, some period of work
in a clove plantation had become part of life throughout Zanzibar and Pemba.
But neither resident ex-slaves nor island-dwelling migrants were willing
to work on clove plantations year-round, for that—above all—would interfere
with their own cultivation. Even as cloves were picked, plantations were
going unweeded and were deteriorating seriously.
Zanzibar had long been part of a wider economic system embracing the
interior of East Africa. Hence, the differing pressures on people to work
in various parts of this region affected the labor situation in Zanzibar.
Migrants from Tanganyika—above all Nyamwezi—began to arrive, seeking cash
and trying to avoid German employers. By 1909, the weeding problem had
been solved. They worked for monthly wages, and many stayed as long as
three or four years.
Officials exempted Nyamwezi from their scorn of ex-slave workers. One
ex-agricultural officer told me that a Nyamwezi with a hoe was like Yehudi
17Menuhin with a violin. What such distinctions meant had to do with how
amenable particular workers within a differentiated labor system were to
work discipline. Nyamwezi had come to Zanzibar to work, not to live. They
11
had paid substantial migration costs and could not move back and forth between
different economic nativities. The mnln issue for them was not balancing
such activities and maintaining control of the rhythm of their lives, but
how much money they could take home. This became clear during the wage cutting
episode of 1924. When officials told Nyamwezi headmen of the impending wage
cuts, they warned that cutting wages would lead to large-scale desertions.
Instead, headmen and officials negotiated a speed-up in lieu of a wage cut.
The daily weeding quota was raised and wages remained the same. Unlike
18
pickers, weeders did not struggle over how they would work.
Unlike the case of the West Indies, immigrant labor did not undermine
the ex-slaves, who continued to squat rent free, working for wages in the
harvest and maintaining a dependent population on the plantation. The migratory
labor system had not been desired or planned by British officials. It evolved
out of their failure to extract labor from ex-slaves and the varying needs,
strengths, and weaknesses of different peoples within a vast and inter-
connected region. However, the separation of economic roles—resident labor,
weeding, and picking—and the reinforcement of this separation by the distinct
ethnic categories that predominated in each role, made each aspect of the
productive process dependent on the others, with the planter being the one
person in a position of coordination. The atomization of the labor process
19
was thus crucial to maintaining planter control. The state—whose labor
bureaux helped to distribute weeders and pickers and which discriminated
in favor of larger plantations—was essential to maintaining the plantation
system, although it was not the plantation system it had sought. The
atomization of plantation labor was a result of the laborers' economic
strength and a cause of their weakness.
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The most radical dimension of the state's labor policy was its attempt
to redefine the boundaries of permissible behavior in Zanzibar, creating a
culture built around property and work. Criminal law was its principal
instrument of redefinition.
Implicit in anti-slavery ideology was the idea that the reliance on
the whip in slave labor had made slaves into disorderly and lazy people.
A complex of crimes was closely linked to slaves and to idleness. The
lumping together of these attitudes and fears is clear in one officials'
observations:
The slaves, especially in the northern part of Pemba won't work..
They are often dancing day and night. The cocoanut trees are cut
for toddy in defiance of the masters, and much drunkenness and
quarrelling ensues. The Walls and Jemedars have many cases of
cutting and wounding brought before them, and the immorality is
frightful. House-breaking and stealing are the natural
consequences of the excess and have been numerous.
The first decade of abolition thus witnessed a strong attack on this
complex of crimes—vagrancy, assault, theft, drunkeness and adultery—all
explicitly associated with ex-slaves. In 1906, one African in twenty in
Zanizbar town was convicted of some petty crime, one in fifty in the
21islands overall. At the same time, sale of native liquor—exceeding the
ban on imported spirits imposed by all colonial powers in accordance with
the Brussels Convention—was prohibited, and the authorities undertook a
vigorous campaign against dancing. Permits were required to hold dances in
22private homes and public dancing was banned altogether. The attack on
petty crime, drinking, and dancing was not a direct attempt to make people
work; it was an assault on the social complex of idleness.
Two types of prosecution which obsessed the Government in the first
decade of the century were directly connected with work. The first was
13
vagrancy, often a favorite in labor repressive economies. Up to 912 vagrants
were prosecuted in a single year after abolition, and stricter statutes
were enacted in 1905 and 1910. But they did hot work effectively. Vagrants
were put to work—on clove plantations or roads—but they left.
The other crime that obsessed officials was the theft of agricultural
produce. Officials views on this subject reflected the extent to which
the category of squatting merged into idleness and idleness into crime.
As the Director of Agriculture put it in 1902, the Zanzibari "can settle on
anybody's land, cultivate a small vegetable patch at his leisure and help
23
himself, under cover of darkness, to coconuts and fruit in his vicinity."
But behind the concern with produce theft was an attempt at redefining
property rights. In fact, it was very much in question whether tenants or
landowners had rights to plantation fruit- Officials were concerned to
substitute a rigid dichotomy between property and propertylessness, distinct
from notions of unequal but shared rights implicit in any dependent social
system, be it slavery or squatting. What ex-slaves may have regarded as
24
their rights, the Government wished to define as a crime.
But the Governments efforts to define property narrowly and work, for
those without property, rigidly were doomed to failure. For a ruling class to
obtain hegemony, as Antonio Gramsci has argued, the exercise of repressive
power by the state must operate in conjunction with the redefinition of
25
culture and social norms by the dominant class. But the state's normative
concepts were at variance not only with its ability to exercise force in
rural areas but with the ideas of the planters it was trying to help.
Planters were trying to manipulate the very relationships the law
was attacking, and the rigid owner-worker dichotomy was for them ideologically
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irrelevant and practically impossible. Seeking plantation residents, planters
could not impose overly rigid labor requirements, and thus rendered the
notion of vagrancy inoperable. The very danger of produce theft made planters
all the more eager to have plantation residents who would keep away outside
thieves, and therefore had to give residents rights within the plantation.
By the 1920s, the state had given up. A myth of rural tranquility
replaced a myth of turbulence. The campaign against vagrancy, produce theft,
and petty crime at most added a little to risks of wandering around without
a patron. In 1920, officials were still saying that ex-slaves "live a life
of vagrancy and indolency on Arabs' plantations." At most the state's
efforts to redefine attitudes to work and property had led ex-slaves to
lead such a life £2. plantations rather than off them.
The colonial state had sought to transform slaves into wage laborers.
For it, the immediate problem was not the actual payment of wages or the
development of a true market in labor—the state had no such purist illusions.
and transformation
The key was the maintainance-of supervision and control, of authority within
the workplace and of stability and order within the society as a whole.
Whatever dislike the British had of Arabs as managers and landlords was
exceeded by the danger of a society without managers and landlords at all.
The problem became one of maintaining class power while transforming
its basis, replacing the personal tyranny and climate of violence associated
with slavery with system based on the legitimacy of law, state enforcement
of contracts, internalized discipline, and the idea that a life of labor
was the lot of the propertyless. The importance of labor tenancy as a
transforming institution has been stressed in a comparative context by Alan
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Richards and in the case of South Africa by Mike Morris. It eased the break
from access to land for the workers, while vested the real power over when
A-
and how labor was done in the landowner. It maintained a personalistic
form of social order and did not strain so greatly the coercive resources
of the state, as would complete alienation of land. And by making part of
the remuneration in the form of access to land for subsistence cultivation
or grazing, it eased strain on owners' cash resources. In other words, Richards
and Morris emphasize that however much world market conditions favored
landlords taking direct control over production in order to intensify it,
the limitations of the power of state and landowners could keep them from
making their control over land and labor complete—allowing workers their
own, small sphere.
At the time of abolition, the colonial state wanted to stabilize ex-slaves
attachment to the estates, but through year-long contracts and an atmosphere
of state-controlled intimidation rather than by a life-long bond and violence.
Such a plan differs from current descriptions of the relationship of
capitalist production and precapitalist reproduction in that both aspects
of life t0oj^ place within a single estate. But production of marketed crops
M/^ycarried on under the direct supervision of the landowner, and production
of subsistence crops, as well as child-rearing and other aspects of
reproduction, w*-d*E.carried out by the tenant. Nevertheless, both spheres were
theoretically under the eye of the landowner, with his power of eviction and
a variety of other sanctions. It was the slaves, not the state, who w<f£.
interested in cash wages and the mobility implicit in the idea of a labor
market; the state stressed control of work, the planters power over people.
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On a descriptive level, the labor tenancy sought by the British and
the secure squatting arrangeneTits sought by the slaves resemble one another.
The difference is in the actual relationship of land rights to labor obligations
The state wanted labor obligations to be fixed and uniform, standardized
to three days per week and enforced by the court. But once the ex-slaves
had proved their ability to avoid the enforcement of the labor obligations,
they had detached the continuity of tenancy from continuous control over
labor. Landowners might control labor during the working day, but not the
working year. Still eager to get what labor they could from resident
workers—whose help was particularly valuable in the early days of a clove
harvest when labor demands were still too low to attract the wave of
migrants—and still seeking to keep off thieves and demonstrate that they
had a peopled plantation, landlords had to concede security of reproduction
to their tenants with only minimal control over production.
The unoppressive quality of the squatter system had little to do with
its legal or formal nature and much to do with the exercise of power.
The old bases of slaveholder power had been undermined: protection was
irrelevant, whipping prohibited, mobility possible, alternative patrons
and alternative income sources available; planters could no longer reproduce
K^
their labor force through the slave trade. The withdrawl of labor time
and mobility were the keys to the slaves1 reaction to the new situation.
But what the new, legalistic and systematic structure envisioned by the
state required was wholesale evictions, tight supervision on plantations,
and a strong police force in the country as a whole. So a system that was
supposed to be cheap and orderly could only be created by measures that
were expensive and dangerous. Other states—even other British colonies—
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have taken chat plunge, and it is important for scholars to remember just
how much of a plunge it is. In Zanzibar—partly because the planters were
A
not white, partly because cloves were not gold—chose instead to manipulate
a system of cash wages and migrant laborers that they the ex-slaves had
forced them to accept. The planters—largely because they had to pay
their workers—could barely keep up with their Indian creditors.
The complex labor process involving resident and short and long term
migrant laborers was thus intertwined with the precise nature of the
accumulation process. Landlords had effective control over trees, but
their control over land was only useful in so far as they shared rights
to it. But the question of trees reveals most clearly the tense limitations
of the accumulation process. Trees are more controllable than land, for they
have no alternative uses other than export production, and the narrowness
of the channels of export production—and the social basis of import-export
trade—gave tree owners a fighting chance to dispose of their tree products,
although clove theft was a problem. The state in turn helped to organize
the flow of labor to tree owners. The owners, while willing to grant squatters
the right to plant ground crops, would not let them plant clove trees, for
that would deprive them of both the chance to make the one investment they
might control and the ability to get even a little labor out of squatters.
And squatters did not want to plant trees—even non-clove trees—for fear that
this would only tempt the landlord to expropriate them. The standoff was
vividly expressed some decades later, when the possibility of independence
k the role of the state into question, by the slogan of the pro-squatter
Afro-Shirazi Party: "The trees are yours; the land is ours." The cry
was both an assertion and a concession.
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Hemmed in by indebtedness, planters had no alternatives to continued
clove cultivation, even when prices declined. Capital for them had no
independent existence; it was literally rooted in the soil. Creditors
had no desire to foreclose, for they could milk their debtors without worrying
about the problems of actual production. The state had once been content
with its clove revenues, but was stuck with an economic system that made
diversification not only economically difficult but socially dangerous.
A class of landowners was sharply separated by land titles from squatters
and workers. The landlords depended on the state for those titles to be
enforced and for help in organizing labor and other resources around their
ownership of clove trees. The squatters were counting on the unwillingness
of the state to make a systematic assault on their access to land. A
standoff ensued, and its terms became entrenched in cultural notions of
reciprocal rights and limits, whose very expression suggested unease and
impermanence. Any innovation that either landlords or squatters made
threatened to upset the standoff. So landlords stuck to their clove trees—
the division of labor built around it allowed them to maintain control, but
provided no basis for a transition from clove production to production in
general. And squatters stuck to cassava, a crop compatible with the needs for
mobility and time to perform other economic activities that insecure tenants
faced. \ • .'
The partial autonomy of squatters within the estate and the partial
involvement of migrant workers in plantation labor were quite sufficient to
get trees weeded and cloves picked. Such was the success of this form
of accumulation, and such were its limits. Social stability and economic
stagnation had become inseparable.
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